Here's an interesting paper on Angola, by David Sogge, published earlier this year
Until the late 1800s, Angola was not a country but merely a string of coastal enclaves. Only in the 20th century did its inland territory gain political boundaries and infrastructure. Several distinct zones arose around crop and labour systems, transport corridors and marketing networks. Out of fragmented socio-linguistic groupings, major ethnic blocs crystallised.
(…)
Colonial and post-colonial elites showed no interest in creating an ‘open access order’ based on citizenship for all and competitive markets. A path was laid down around a weak but autocratic colonial state dependent on outside powers. Mediocre institutions and underskilled people were additional legacies. Angolan nationalist movements, their leaders imbued with norms of a ‘limited access order’, and habituated to the use of armed force, had no ready alternatives when they assumed power.
(…)
Thanks to a US-led crusade against it, to a flow of petrodollars and to a free market in military goods and services, Angola is today a highly militarised and ‘securitised’ place, one capable of deploying forces affecting politics in other African countries. Relative to the size of its population, Angola’s military, police and paramilitary forces are the largest in sub-Saharan Africa, with the probable exception of Eritrea.
(…)
A formal legal system has never been accessible to ordinary Angolans. Today the judicial branch remains weak and subordinated to central authorities. Its deficits in staff and operating systems are gradually being addressed. Courts enjoy a certain amount of public confidence. But there are few precedents of citizens bringing suit against the authorities.
(…)
Through its command of the airwaves and powers to intimidate or buy off critics, the regime controls and colours the information available to most of the public. Self-censorship is rampant. Comparative indexes compiled by Reporters Without Borders and Freedom House commonly rank Angola’s press freedoms among the more restricted in Africa, though not among the most restricted.
(…)
In Angola, the political class resides onshore but is anchored financially offshore. Its power depends on its partnership with oil corporations and the technical, financial, diplomatic and military resources they provide directly or effectively guarantee. Yet the partnership is not one of equal risks and benefits. For example, the terms of Production Sharing Contracts cushion oil corporations against price fluctuations, thereby exposing Angola to most risks of income volatility.
Companies’ technical and financial control prevents outsiders, Angolan authorities included, from knowing with any precision what actual oil output and profits are. Shielded by national and supra-national rules crafted through massive lobbying, oil corporations use transfer pricing and bank secrecy to put their revenue beyond anyone’s tax jurisdiction.
In short, Angola may be as much sinned against as sinning. Its treasury, just as treasuries elsewhere, including those of richer countries where oil companies are headquartered, is not receiving a fair share.
(…)
Should Angola persist in its current pattern of elite-centred consumption and hydrocarbon centred production, it will probably face a serious downturn by around 2020. The revenue shock triggered in 2008 by falling oil and diamond prices (accompanied in all likelihood by accelerated capital flight) provides a foretaste of what may lie ahead. The next decade could see an abrupt end to rising expectations among urban strata who aspire to stable middle class lifestyles. The current development model is thus a ticking political time bomb. The coming decade will reveal whether that bomb will be defused or not.
(…)
During the war years, the MPLA leadership ultimately overpowered domestic rivals with both military coercion and material persuasion. It gained allegiance of former rivals by furnishing access to perks, property and privileged means of extracting rents and access to foreign exchange. These measures neutralised more and more opponents, convincing most to ally themselves to the MPLA government in an everbroader elite coalition. Those showing too much ingroup loyalty or reliance on foreign economic circuits independently of Futungo would find themselves suddenly denied official favours and frozen out.
(…)
However, forums for politics made by citizens themselves are unwelcome. It is far from clear that promised electoral competition at local levels will change that. The MPLA in any case has begun preparing the ground in some detail; for example, to meet gender balances mandated in law, wives of MPLA officials are being groomed (training courses in Brazil, etc.) for elected office. The authorities emphasise gradualism in these kinds of political innovations, just as they leave no doubt that significant powers will remain in their hands.
(…)
The MPLA and Futungo have advanced the ‘colonisation’ of the civil domain by creating foundations and NGOs answerable to them. Access to benefit streams is also managed through such patronage devices as the ‘Specialty Committees’ (Comités do Partido de Especialidade) created in 2004 as a means of drawing professionals, journalists, technicians and other ‘intellectuals’ into the Party’s orbit.
A test of Angola’s elite bargains will be that of presidential succession. As of 2009 there is no evident ‘crown prince’. The choice of successor to President dos Santos will fall to a ‘selectorate’ of senior political and military figures. Toadying, back-stabbing and fallsfrom- grace have long been part of Futungo court politics, but current elite pacts appear to be broadly robust. With no one faction seriously at risk, a smooth succession process seems entirely feasible.
(…)
Capping the appearance of state resilience is the regime’s political legitimacy. As of 2009 that looks unassailable. The MPLA’s triumph in the parliamentary elections of 2008 was too massive to be attributed only to manipulation of the system and of ignorant and dissenting voters, though those things certainly played a part. For memories of war are still fresh; some people feared a return of instability like that following the last elections in 1992. Many Angolans may also simply prefer a “delegative democracy” where an acquiescent public accepts whatever the regime chooses to supply.’ All these factors probably helped tip votes toward the ruling party, for want of any credible alternative.
[Full paper here]
(…)
Colonial and post-colonial elites showed no interest in creating an ‘open access order’ based on citizenship for all and competitive markets. A path was laid down around a weak but autocratic colonial state dependent on outside powers. Mediocre institutions and underskilled people were additional legacies. Angolan nationalist movements, their leaders imbued with norms of a ‘limited access order’, and habituated to the use of armed force, had no ready alternatives when they assumed power.
(…)
Thanks to a US-led crusade against it, to a flow of petrodollars and to a free market in military goods and services, Angola is today a highly militarised and ‘securitised’ place, one capable of deploying forces affecting politics in other African countries. Relative to the size of its population, Angola’s military, police and paramilitary forces are the largest in sub-Saharan Africa, with the probable exception of Eritrea.
(…)
A formal legal system has never been accessible to ordinary Angolans. Today the judicial branch remains weak and subordinated to central authorities. Its deficits in staff and operating systems are gradually being addressed. Courts enjoy a certain amount of public confidence. But there are few precedents of citizens bringing suit against the authorities.
(…)
Through its command of the airwaves and powers to intimidate or buy off critics, the regime controls and colours the information available to most of the public. Self-censorship is rampant. Comparative indexes compiled by Reporters Without Borders and Freedom House commonly rank Angola’s press freedoms among the more restricted in Africa, though not among the most restricted.
(…)
In Angola, the political class resides onshore but is anchored financially offshore. Its power depends on its partnership with oil corporations and the technical, financial, diplomatic and military resources they provide directly or effectively guarantee. Yet the partnership is not one of equal risks and benefits. For example, the terms of Production Sharing Contracts cushion oil corporations against price fluctuations, thereby exposing Angola to most risks of income volatility.
Companies’ technical and financial control prevents outsiders, Angolan authorities included, from knowing with any precision what actual oil output and profits are. Shielded by national and supra-national rules crafted through massive lobbying, oil corporations use transfer pricing and bank secrecy to put their revenue beyond anyone’s tax jurisdiction.
In short, Angola may be as much sinned against as sinning. Its treasury, just as treasuries elsewhere, including those of richer countries where oil companies are headquartered, is not receiving a fair share.
(…)
Should Angola persist in its current pattern of elite-centred consumption and hydrocarbon centred production, it will probably face a serious downturn by around 2020. The revenue shock triggered in 2008 by falling oil and diamond prices (accompanied in all likelihood by accelerated capital flight) provides a foretaste of what may lie ahead. The next decade could see an abrupt end to rising expectations among urban strata who aspire to stable middle class lifestyles. The current development model is thus a ticking political time bomb. The coming decade will reveal whether that bomb will be defused or not.
(…)
During the war years, the MPLA leadership ultimately overpowered domestic rivals with both military coercion and material persuasion. It gained allegiance of former rivals by furnishing access to perks, property and privileged means of extracting rents and access to foreign exchange. These measures neutralised more and more opponents, convincing most to ally themselves to the MPLA government in an everbroader elite coalition. Those showing too much ingroup loyalty or reliance on foreign economic circuits independently of Futungo would find themselves suddenly denied official favours and frozen out.
(…)
However, forums for politics made by citizens themselves are unwelcome. It is far from clear that promised electoral competition at local levels will change that. The MPLA in any case has begun preparing the ground in some detail; for example, to meet gender balances mandated in law, wives of MPLA officials are being groomed (training courses in Brazil, etc.) for elected office. The authorities emphasise gradualism in these kinds of political innovations, just as they leave no doubt that significant powers will remain in their hands.
(…)
The MPLA and Futungo have advanced the ‘colonisation’ of the civil domain by creating foundations and NGOs answerable to them. Access to benefit streams is also managed through such patronage devices as the ‘Specialty Committees’ (Comités do Partido de Especialidade) created in 2004 as a means of drawing professionals, journalists, technicians and other ‘intellectuals’ into the Party’s orbit.
A test of Angola’s elite bargains will be that of presidential succession. As of 2009 there is no evident ‘crown prince’. The choice of successor to President dos Santos will fall to a ‘selectorate’ of senior political and military figures. Toadying, back-stabbing and fallsfrom- grace have long been part of Futungo court politics, but current elite pacts appear to be broadly robust. With no one faction seriously at risk, a smooth succession process seems entirely feasible.
(…)
Capping the appearance of state resilience is the regime’s political legitimacy. As of 2009 that looks unassailable. The MPLA’s triumph in the parliamentary elections of 2008 was too massive to be attributed only to manipulation of the system and of ignorant and dissenting voters, though those things certainly played a part. For memories of war are still fresh; some people feared a return of instability like that following the last elections in 1992. Many Angolans may also simply prefer a “delegative democracy” where an acquiescent public accepts whatever the regime chooses to supply.’ All these factors probably helped tip votes toward the ruling party, for want of any credible alternative.
[Full paper here]
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