Friday, 19 November 2010
Saturday, 2 October 2010
Outros Preconceitos...
Mas afinale os boers nao sao todos “declaradamente neo-nazis”?!
Como e’ que agora aparecem por ai imagens e mensagens destas?
Como os "peritos em Historia" e "PhDs em estudos inter-culturais" deve(ria)m saber, os boers (que convem aqui esclarecer, e' um termo que significa campones ou fazendeiro - farmer, em Ingles - pelo que nao abrange a totalidade dos Afrikaners) sempre estiveram longe de ser "os brancos mais ricos da Africa do Sul" (tal como os seus coloured sempre estiveram longe de ser os mulatos mais previligiados naquele pais"): alguem que conheca bem a genese da guerra Anglo-Boer e as intrincancias do Great Trek, sabera' identificar as causas estruturais da pobreza entre os Afrikaners e encontrara' imagens ainda piores do que essas ao longo da historia da ocupacao europeia da Africa do Sul, bem como de instancias de auto-segregacionismo na era pos-Apartheid (tenho em mente umas em particular que aqui trarei assim que as encontrar) que conduzem a situacoes de exclusao socio-economica e de falta de apoio institucional a luta contra a pobreza nessas comunidades por parte do estado...
Mas essa ideia de que "a pobreza entre alguns segmentos de brancos na Africa pos-colonial so' pode ser resultado da 'perseguicao' que lhes e' movida pelos governos de maioria negra" e', no fundo, reveladora, para alem da santa ignorancia, do substracto racista (ou realista?) da mentalidade dos seus autores e propagadores - e' que, claramente, para eles nem todos os homens nascem iguais; ou talvez sim, mas uns nascem mais iguais do que outros... : "shock, shock, horror, horror, onde e' que ja' se viu um branco pobre em Africa? Onde e' que ja' se viu um branco, ou mulato, varrer ruas em Angola?!"
Pessoalmente, confesso que nunca vi brancos, nem mulatos, a varrer ruas em Angola, mas ja' vi, na Angola colonial, quitandeiras brancas com cestas a cabeca gritando "fartura fresquinha!", tal como as kitandeiras negras de balaios a cabeca gritavam "e' maboke, mabokinha docinha minha senhora!"... A questao neste caso e' saber-se se a quitandeira branca era-o apenas ocasional e temporariamente (em geral, quando recem-chegada da sua igualmente pobre vida na metropole e antes de o marido fazer dinheiro suficiente na loja de fuba e vinho 'baptizado' no muceke para poder "tira-la das ruas"), ou permanente e estruturalmente, como em geral o era a kitandeira negra...
Questao semelhante se revelara' se se colocarem lado a lado essas imagens de boers pobres (e devo dizer que - como aqui referi - ja' vi muitos boers de pes descalcos - e sujos! - mas esse e' um 'habito cultural' que atravessa transversalmente as comunidades Afrikaners, entre ricos e pobres) com as da pobreza entre a maioria negra: hao-de encontrar, como ja' vi, familias e comunidades inteiras de negros a comerem directamente das lixeiras nos arredores das cidades brancas (entre outros, de boers ricos...).
Mas talvez a comparacao mais pertinente seja entre os numeros absolutos e relativos da pobreza entre brancos e negros na Africa do Sul. Revelem-nos quando os encontrarem, porque eu ai ja' dei!
Mas afinale os boers nao sao todos “declaradamente neo-nazis”?!
Como e’ que agora aparecem por ai imagens e mensagens destas?
Como os "peritos em Historia" e "PhDs em estudos inter-culturais" deve(ria)m saber, os boers (que convem aqui esclarecer, e' um termo que significa campones ou fazendeiro - farmer, em Ingles - pelo que nao abrange a totalidade dos Afrikaners) sempre estiveram longe de ser "os brancos mais ricos da Africa do Sul" (tal como os seus coloured sempre estiveram longe de ser os mulatos mais previligiados naquele pais"): alguem que conheca bem a genese da guerra Anglo-Boer e as intrincancias do Great Trek, sabera' identificar as causas estruturais da pobreza entre os Afrikaners e encontrara' imagens ainda piores do que essas ao longo da historia da ocupacao europeia da Africa do Sul, bem como de instancias de auto-segregacionismo na era pos-Apartheid (tenho em mente umas em particular que aqui trarei assim que as encontrar) que conduzem a situacoes de exclusao socio-economica e de falta de apoio institucional a luta contra a pobreza nessas comunidades por parte do estado...
Mas essa ideia de que "a pobreza entre alguns segmentos de brancos na Africa pos-colonial so' pode ser resultado da 'perseguicao' que lhes e' movida pelos governos de maioria negra" e', no fundo, reveladora, para alem da santa ignorancia, do substracto racista (ou realista?) da mentalidade dos seus autores e propagadores - e' que, claramente, para eles nem todos os homens nascem iguais; ou talvez sim, mas uns nascem mais iguais do que outros... : "shock, shock, horror, horror, onde e' que ja' se viu um branco pobre em Africa? Onde e' que ja' se viu um branco, ou mulato, varrer ruas em Angola?!"
Pessoalmente, confesso que nunca vi brancos, nem mulatos, a varrer ruas em Angola, mas ja' vi, na Angola colonial, quitandeiras brancas com cestas a cabeca gritando "fartura fresquinha!", tal como as kitandeiras negras de balaios a cabeca gritavam "e' maboke, mabokinha docinha minha senhora!"... A questao neste caso e' saber-se se a quitandeira branca era-o apenas ocasional e temporariamente (em geral, quando recem-chegada da sua igualmente pobre vida na metropole e antes de o marido fazer dinheiro suficiente na loja de fuba e vinho 'baptizado' no muceke para poder "tira-la das ruas"), ou permanente e estruturalmente, como em geral o era a kitandeira negra...
Questao semelhante se revelara' se se colocarem lado a lado essas imagens de boers pobres (e devo dizer que - como aqui referi - ja' vi muitos boers de pes descalcos - e sujos! - mas esse e' um 'habito cultural' que atravessa transversalmente as comunidades Afrikaners, entre ricos e pobres) com as da pobreza entre a maioria negra: hao-de encontrar, como ja' vi, familias e comunidades inteiras de negros a comerem directamente das lixeiras nos arredores das cidades brancas (entre outros, de boers ricos...).
Mas talvez a comparacao mais pertinente seja entre os numeros absolutos e relativos da pobreza entre brancos e negros na Africa do Sul. Revelem-nos quando os encontrarem, porque eu ai ja' dei!
Tuesday, 7 September 2010
Mozambique: Aid, Inequality and Protest

As a background to the recent riots over price rises in Maputo, extracts from an article published two months ago by The Economist:
(...)
At the end of the civil war in 1992, Mozambique was arguably the world’s poorest country. Its transport, education and health systems were in ruins. Many Mozambicans with marketable skills had fled. But now its economy is one of the fastest-growing in the world. In the past 15 years it has swelled by an average of 8% a year, dipping slightly to 6% during last year’s global meltdown, with nearly 7% expected this year, well above the 4% the World Bank forecast for southern Africa as a whole.
(…)
Mozambique’s government is democratically elected and stable, its macroeconomic policies sound, its press reasonably free. Often held up as one of the best examples of post-conflict recovery in Africa, it has become a donor darling. This year international aid will total some $1.6 billion, worth more than half the total state budget. Foreign investment is pouring in.
But the country has a long way to go. In various international rankings, it is still among the world’s worst performers: 129th (out of 133 countries) in the World Economic Forum’s global competitiveness index; 172nd (out of 182) in the UN’s human-development index; and still in the bottom dozen in terms of GDP per head a year, at less than $1,000 in purchasing-power parity, according to the IMF. Despite a much-aired fall in the poverty rate from 69% in 1997 to 54% in 2003, the absolute number living below the poverty line rose to 11.7m in a population of around 20m. The latest national household survey, due out in August, is expected to show little improvement. Inequality has been growing.
(…)
International donors, keen to point to Mozambique as a rare African aid success, have been getting worried. Earlier this year a group of 19 Western countries threatened a “donor strike” unless Mozambique cleaned up its act. Only after its government meekly agreed to implement the 35 reforms proposed by the so-called G19 did the aid start flowing again. Far from sounding resentful, however, Mozambique’s prime minister, Aires Aly, says the threatened strike was “in some ways good for us, because it made us realise that some issues in our programme needed review.” Without the aid, he knows his country would not be such a star performer.
[Full article here]

As a background to the recent riots over price rises in Maputo, extracts from an article published two months ago by The Economist:
(...)
At the end of the civil war in 1992, Mozambique was arguably the world’s poorest country. Its transport, education and health systems were in ruins. Many Mozambicans with marketable skills had fled. But now its economy is one of the fastest-growing in the world. In the past 15 years it has swelled by an average of 8% a year, dipping slightly to 6% during last year’s global meltdown, with nearly 7% expected this year, well above the 4% the World Bank forecast for southern Africa as a whole.
(…)
Mozambique’s government is democratically elected and stable, its macroeconomic policies sound, its press reasonably free. Often held up as one of the best examples of post-conflict recovery in Africa, it has become a donor darling. This year international aid will total some $1.6 billion, worth more than half the total state budget. Foreign investment is pouring in.
But the country has a long way to go. In various international rankings, it is still among the world’s worst performers: 129th (out of 133 countries) in the World Economic Forum’s global competitiveness index; 172nd (out of 182) in the UN’s human-development index; and still in the bottom dozen in terms of GDP per head a year, at less than $1,000 in purchasing-power parity, according to the IMF. Despite a much-aired fall in the poverty rate from 69% in 1997 to 54% in 2003, the absolute number living below the poverty line rose to 11.7m in a population of around 20m. The latest national household survey, due out in August, is expected to show little improvement. Inequality has been growing.
(…)
International donors, keen to point to Mozambique as a rare African aid success, have been getting worried. Earlier this year a group of 19 Western countries threatened a “donor strike” unless Mozambique cleaned up its act. Only after its government meekly agreed to implement the 35 reforms proposed by the so-called G19 did the aid start flowing again. Far from sounding resentful, however, Mozambique’s prime minister, Aires Aly, says the threatened strike was “in some ways good for us, because it made us realise that some issues in our programme needed review.” Without the aid, he knows his country would not be such a star performer.
[Full article here]
Thursday, 2 September 2010
Maputo Protests Over Price Rises
Two children have been shot dead and at least four more have been killed during riots in Mozambique.
Police and rioters clash in the capital Maputo, as rioters take to the streets in protest over rising prices.
Police use tear gas and fire rubber bullets into the crowds.
But they quickly ran out of bullets and began firing live rounds.
The protests appear to have been touched off when the government boosted bread prices by 30 percent on Wednesday.
[Woman in Portuguese]:
"They increase the price of bread, rice, oil. Everything is expensive."
Hospital sources report that at least 11 people have been injured in the clashes.
One doctor speaks with reporters.
[Unidentified Doctor]:
"So far we have received 11 wounded, six hit by bullets, one due to a fall, another one hit by a stone. Some of the wounded are in serious condition in the intensive care unit. We are prepared to receive all wounded."
The increase in the price of bread comes as wheat prices have shot up worldwide.
The impoverished country is also heavily dependent on imports from South Africa.
South African products have become increasingly expensive in recent months, compounding the misery in Mozambique.
Two children have been shot dead and at least four more have been killed during riots in Mozambique.
Police and rioters clash in the capital Maputo, as rioters take to the streets in protest over rising prices.
Police use tear gas and fire rubber bullets into the crowds.
But they quickly ran out of bullets and began firing live rounds.
The protests appear to have been touched off when the government boosted bread prices by 30 percent on Wednesday.
[Woman in Portuguese]:
"They increase the price of bread, rice, oil. Everything is expensive."
Hospital sources report that at least 11 people have been injured in the clashes.
One doctor speaks with reporters.
[Unidentified Doctor]:
"So far we have received 11 wounded, six hit by bullets, one due to a fall, another one hit by a stone. Some of the wounded are in serious condition in the intensive care unit. We are prepared to receive all wounded."
The increase in the price of bread comes as wheat prices have shot up worldwide.
The impoverished country is also heavily dependent on imports from South Africa.
South African products have become increasingly expensive in recent months, compounding the misery in Mozambique.
Tuesday, 24 August 2010
A Menina que nasceu em cima da arvore: um update
Numa das estorias (... a par desta...), senao A ESTORIA (!), que fez recair sobre mim a chuva, ou melhor - enxurrada (!), de lama e pedras desta campanha, assim terminava, ha' ja' algum tempo, a minha "nota de rodape'" a este post:Apenas para terminar numa nota com algum humor, uma estoria que me foi contada por um amigo Mocambicano*: lembram-se daquela mulher que, durante as cheias de 2000 em Mocambique, teve um bebe em cima de uma arvore? Pois bem, depois daquelas imagens que correram mundo, choveram-lhe donativos monetarios e materiais de todo o mundo, de tal modo que a senhora ficou rica e passou a gozar de uma grande admiracao por parte da comunidade, nao so’ por ter tido um bebe naquelas condicoes, mas tambem porque toda a riqueza de que a familia agora usufruia se devia a ela… Entao, nas grandes cheias que se seguiram, um grupo de uma comunidade vizinha que tinha perdido todos os seus bens foi bater-lhe a porta pedindo: minha senhora, agora que esta’ rica e nao lhe falta nada, por favor ajude-nos… qualquer coisa serve mesmo… qualquer coisa que nao precise so’! Entao a senhora gritou para o marido que estava dentro de casa: oh Joao, vem ca’ que estao a te precisar aqui fora!
Na verdade, a senhora, de seu nome Carolina Pedro, para alem dos varios donativos que recebeu na altura, nao ficou nada "rica" (embora tambem nao tenha ficado mais pobre do que era, em particular se em comparacao com os seus antigos vizinhos e familiares), mas "ganhou" uma boa casa definitiva de tijolo com um grande quintal, um emprego como empregada de limpeza num escritorio governamental na cidade e um lugar na escola local para a filha que, ha' 10 anos, trouxe ao mundo em cima de uma arvore, a Rosita. Para alem desses ganhos materiais, teve outras "recompensas" como a sua estoria ter passado a fazer parte do curriculum escolar nacional e a colocacao de uma placa alusiva no sope' da arvore onde o memoravel parto teve lugar.
Claro que a estoria do marido era a punchline da anedota, mas segundo este update nao andava la' muito longe da realidade: o dito marido, cujo nome verdadeiro e' Salvador (embora, como esta' bom de ver, dificilmente seria capaz de salvar a mulher e a filha na altura daquele parto, nao fossem os helicopteros da ajuda internacional...), se nao passa a vida a dormir (jiboiar talvez seja o termo mais apropriado) dentro de casa, e' acusado de ser um pai ausente e de se ter apropriado e gasto futilmente praticamente todo o dinheiro que foi dado a familia na sequencia do nascimento da filha naquelas circunstancias, pelo que, apesar dos "ganhos" da dona Carolina, a familia, a qual entretanto se juntou mais uma filha, a Cecilia, agora com 10 meses, por causa da vida perdularia do 'senhor' Salvador, nao tem o rendimento necessario para manter o seu novo lifestyle e tem passado por alguns momentos dificeis...
Mas nem tudo esta' perdido para a dona Carolina: a Rosita, que e' mesmo uma warrior desde o momento em que NASCEU MULHER, diz que a sua grande ambicao e' ser... Presidente da Republica!
(... E suspeito bem que o seu slogan de campanha nao sera' nada parecido com algo como "Okotunda Olunga"!...)
*(Quem me contou esta anedota, na Zambia, foi o meu amigo Luis de quem falo neste post, ao qual, como prometido, voltarei tao logo possa)
[Update, em Ingles, aqui]
Warrior (in Xemplify) - Khethi (South Africa)
Numa das estorias (... a par desta...), senao A ESTORIA (!), que fez recair sobre mim a chuva, ou melhor - enxurrada (!), de lama e pedras desta campanha, assim terminava, ha' ja' algum tempo, a minha "nota de rodape'" a este post:Apenas para terminar numa nota com algum humor, uma estoria que me foi contada por um amigo Mocambicano*: lembram-se daquela mulher que, durante as cheias de 2000 em Mocambique, teve um bebe em cima de uma arvore? Pois bem, depois daquelas imagens que correram mundo, choveram-lhe donativos monetarios e materiais de todo o mundo, de tal modo que a senhora ficou rica e passou a gozar de uma grande admiracao por parte da comunidade, nao so’ por ter tido um bebe naquelas condicoes, mas tambem porque toda a riqueza de que a familia agora usufruia se devia a ela… Entao, nas grandes cheias que se seguiram, um grupo de uma comunidade vizinha que tinha perdido todos os seus bens foi bater-lhe a porta pedindo: minha senhora, agora que esta’ rica e nao lhe falta nada, por favor ajude-nos… qualquer coisa serve mesmo… qualquer coisa que nao precise so’! Entao a senhora gritou para o marido que estava dentro de casa: oh Joao, vem ca’ que estao a te precisar aqui fora!
Na verdade, a senhora, de seu nome Carolina Pedro, para alem dos varios donativos que recebeu na altura, nao ficou nada "rica" (embora tambem nao tenha ficado mais pobre do que era, em particular se em comparacao com os seus antigos vizinhos e familiares), mas "ganhou" uma boa casa definitiva de tijolo com um grande quintal, um emprego como empregada de limpeza num escritorio governamental na cidade e um lugar na escola local para a filha que, ha' 10 anos, trouxe ao mundo em cima de uma arvore, a Rosita. Para alem desses ganhos materiais, teve outras "recompensas" como a sua estoria ter passado a fazer parte do curriculum escolar nacional e a colocacao de uma placa alusiva no sope' da arvore onde o memoravel parto teve lugar.
Claro que a estoria do marido era a punchline da anedota, mas segundo este update nao andava la' muito longe da realidade: o dito marido, cujo nome verdadeiro e' Salvador (embora, como esta' bom de ver, dificilmente seria capaz de salvar a mulher e a filha na altura daquele parto, nao fossem os helicopteros da ajuda internacional...), se nao passa a vida a dormir (jiboiar talvez seja o termo mais apropriado) dentro de casa, e' acusado de ser um pai ausente e de se ter apropriado e gasto futilmente praticamente todo o dinheiro que foi dado a familia na sequencia do nascimento da filha naquelas circunstancias, pelo que, apesar dos "ganhos" da dona Carolina, a familia, a qual entretanto se juntou mais uma filha, a Cecilia, agora com 10 meses, por causa da vida perdularia do 'senhor' Salvador, nao tem o rendimento necessario para manter o seu novo lifestyle e tem passado por alguns momentos dificeis...
Mas nem tudo esta' perdido para a dona Carolina: a Rosita, que e' mesmo uma warrior desde o momento em que NASCEU MULHER, diz que a sua grande ambicao e' ser... Presidente da Republica!
(... E suspeito bem que o seu slogan de campanha nao sera' nada parecido com algo como "Okotunda Olunga"!...)
*(Quem me contou esta anedota, na Zambia, foi o meu amigo Luis de quem falo neste post, ao qual, como prometido, voltarei tao logo possa)
[Update, em Ingles, aqui]
Warrior (in Xemplify) - Khethi (South Africa)
Monday, 9 August 2010
Um "Convite a Mendicidade"?*...
(...) O ritmo é forte e a marcha está mesmo muito acelerada. Veja-se o que está a mudar. Quem não puder acompanhar esta passada, tem de melhorar o seu desempenho físico e intelectual, quanto mais não seja olhando para os exemplos que chegam de cima.(...) São infelizes porque querem.(...) Porque embora a marcha de Angola para o progresso esteja muito acelerada, todos podem acompanhá-la. E aqueles que por qualquer razão se sintam diminuídos para entrar no ritmo, só têm que pedir uma mão amiga que os ajude.
*(...Ou a Prostituicao?)
(...) O ritmo é forte e a marcha está mesmo muito acelerada. Veja-se o que está a mudar. Quem não puder acompanhar esta passada, tem de melhorar o seu desempenho físico e intelectual, quanto mais não seja olhando para os exemplos que chegam de cima.(...) São infelizes porque querem.(...) Porque embora a marcha de Angola para o progresso esteja muito acelerada, todos podem acompanhá-la. E aqueles que por qualquer razão se sintam diminuídos para entrar no ritmo, só têm que pedir uma mão amiga que os ajude.
*(...Ou a Prostituicao?)
Thursday, 22 October 2009
DAMBISA MOYO's "DEAD AID"
I have been so immersed in my ongoing research on China-Africa economic relations since January, including a brief stint as Research Director of the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa, during the first half of this year, that I totally missed all the furore made around Dambisa Moyo’s book "Dead Aid" on the (in)effectiveness of aid to eradicate poverty in Africa.This has been a recurring theme in this blog since I started it. However, my critique of the aid industry always fell short of calling for a total halt to it and… of writing a book on the subject! As put in her dubbed "Anti-Bono (another recurring subjet in this blog) interview" for the New York Times Magazine, “you are perhaps the first African to request in book form that all development aid be halted within five years.”
The Economist follows the same thread: “(…) Yet the intellectual arguments about aid are still conducted largely within a small circle of Western white men. So it is good to welcome a new voice to the debate, and a black African woman too, Dambisa Moyo, a Zambian economist at Goldman Sachs. It is remarkable that so few voices have been raised in Africa, supposedly the main beneficiary of the world’s largesse, about how the aid money should be spent, or even whether it should be received at all.”
It then goes on to argue that “unfortunately, Ms Moyo’s contribution ends there, for “Dead Aid” does not move the debate along much. Yes, she has joined the chorus of disapproval—and that in itself might surprise a few diehards who think that Africans should just be grateful for the aid and shut up. But her arguments are scarcely original and her plodding prose makes her the least stylish of the critics. Moreover, she overstates her case, almost to the point of caricature. There is almost nobody left, even in the aid lobby, who seriously thinks that bilateral (government-to-government) aid is the sole answer to world poverty, as she suggests. “Trade not aid” is only one of several newish mantras among aidniks that seem to have passed her by.”
A review of reviews by The Complete Review on "Dead Aid" concludes: “No consensus -- and the global financial-world meltdown makes for bad timing for the argument.”
I couldn’t find the time to read the book yet, so it was with great pleasure and gratefulness that, while gradually catching up with ‘all the fuss about it’ (which included Moyo's nomination by Time Magazine as one of the 100 most influential people in the world), I came across what is certainly one of the most meaningful reviews made of it. Meaningful on various counts: it was one of the first among the many published so far; it was written by a Zambian; it was made by an economist; it was by my good friend Cho. And, above all, it was a thorough, insightful, thought-provoking and analytically-sound review too. Moreover, it was enriched by the interesting debate it generated among his readers. I am sorry that I missed it at the time, but having read it in the last few days I can only strongly recommend it to my readers as well. Here’s the gist of it:
"The central argument of Dead Aid is that aid is the fundamental cause of poverty and therefore eliminating aid is critical to spur growth in ailing African states. Aid is the disease that we must treat to bring us back to full economic health. A bold and daring statement built around the central belief that aid distorts incentives among policymakers and society at large. It makes governments less accountable to their citizens and has led to civil wars, rampant corruption (electoral and otherwise) and has been central to an undercurrent of irresponsibility culminating in increased and self-reinforcing poverty since independence from colonialism. None of these arguments are new of course, but Dambisa is probably the first economist to boldly claim that aid causes poverty.
If aid is the disease that causes endless bleeding, to stop the bleeding you simply need to stop aid, the only challenge therefore is how to do it. The Dead Aid solution is a five year exit strategy built around the idea of incentivising poor countries to access finance on international markets, supported by the tripod of microfinance, trade/FDI and remittances. In the Dead Aid world there’s a stash of money out there on the international financial markets that is just waiting to be tapped by any African country willing to invest in a credit rating. If African countries can enter these markets and borrow, it would provide the right incentives to spark good governance since the international markets would be more willing to “punish” bad behaviour compared to those that provide aid at infinitum. In other words, borrowing through international financial markets is a sort of "self commitment mechanism" to good governance, and with that comes better long term prosperity. It is certainly likely to be slightly more expensive than “easy money” that concessional loans and grants bring, but by rejecting these overtures nation states will find themselves on a better path to prosperity. The trouble is that African governments have limited incentives to do this on their own, though some have made progress in this direction, so they need to be compelled through the Dead Aid proposal of terminating aid completely within a five year period.
(…)
I am afraid to say, and with deep sorrow, that the Dead Aid proposal falls far short in many areas, with at least four worth highlighting.
First, there’s a general lack of clear analytical rigour evidenced by elementary confusion in key areas : correlation/causality issues; definitional problems; poor evidence on policy counterfactuals; incomplete and unbalanced citation of evidence; and, perhaps more worryingly lack of general familiarity with refined areas of existing literature.
Secondly, the treatment of aid in a homogeneous and aggregate way is particularly problematic. Dead Aid defines aid as the “sum total of concessional loans and grants”, but excludes “emergency aid” e.g. help for Darfur or the Asian Tsunami. There’s no distinction within Dead Aid between budget support, infrastructure aid, person to person aid, heath related aid, grants or concessional loans for discretionary spending. It is all discussed under one umbrella and handed the same fate.
Thirdly, Dead Aid is characterised by a plethora of inconsistent arguments. A key example that stands out is the emotive issue of Chinese investment. Dambisa dedicates a whole chapter explaining why the “Chinese are our friends”, largely arguing from their historical involvement in Africa and their renewed commitment to trade and FDI. However, against a backdrop of Dead Aid’s “anti-dependency” rhetoric , the chant for China appears odd. Let us be clear, China is not only bringing FDI to Africa but it has also brought concessional loans and long term dependency. Zambia’s external debt has now risen to about $2bn since the HIPC completion point, a significant part of that is through new agreements with the Chinese government and Chinese businesses. A closer look at Angola reveals the same truth. Not only is China investing heavily in that country but in exchange it is tying Angola and other countries to China for a long time reducing their options to renege in the future. That is not necessarily bad, but if the central worry is that dependency leads to ineffective governments with poor incentives we should be honest enough to consider the possibility that China’s closeness to many African governments (which are not all democratic) may have similar negative impacts as aid.
Fourth and finally, the solutions proposed by Dead Aid are ineffective. This is not surprising because without a clear definition of the problem, it is inevitable that the solutions would not work. But even if one was to accept Dead Aid’s basic premise that aid is bad, its solutions come far short. It’s quite obvious to any ordinary analyst that in order to assess whether any proposals would present an overall improvement beyond the status quo, we need to define what happens in the counterfactual carefully and then judge that against proposed policy initiatives.
(…)
In short on both theory and practice, Dead Aid falls far short of what is expected of a book advocating such a radical proposal of “turning off the aid tap”. If there’s any consolation in this assessment, it is that Dead Aid will hopefully not find any intellectual traction. The analytical consensus remains that aid is important and the challenge is how to make it smarter, better and ultimately beneficial to the poor. This question has never been more urgent given the limited aid resources around. Dambisa is certainly right about one thing, now is the time to examine these issues and we can certainly do better than the present!"
I have been so immersed in my ongoing research on China-Africa economic relations since January, including a brief stint as Research Director of the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa, during the first half of this year, that I totally missed all the furore made around Dambisa Moyo’s book "Dead Aid" on the (in)effectiveness of aid to eradicate poverty in Africa.This has been a recurring theme in this blog since I started it. However, my critique of the aid industry always fell short of calling for a total halt to it and… of writing a book on the subject! As put in her dubbed "Anti-Bono (another recurring subjet in this blog) interview" for the New York Times Magazine, “you are perhaps the first African to request in book form that all development aid be halted within five years.”
The Economist follows the same thread: “(…) Yet the intellectual arguments about aid are still conducted largely within a small circle of Western white men. So it is good to welcome a new voice to the debate, and a black African woman too, Dambisa Moyo, a Zambian economist at Goldman Sachs. It is remarkable that so few voices have been raised in Africa, supposedly the main beneficiary of the world’s largesse, about how the aid money should be spent, or even whether it should be received at all.”
It then goes on to argue that “unfortunately, Ms Moyo’s contribution ends there, for “Dead Aid” does not move the debate along much. Yes, she has joined the chorus of disapproval—and that in itself might surprise a few diehards who think that Africans should just be grateful for the aid and shut up. But her arguments are scarcely original and her plodding prose makes her the least stylish of the critics. Moreover, she overstates her case, almost to the point of caricature. There is almost nobody left, even in the aid lobby, who seriously thinks that bilateral (government-to-government) aid is the sole answer to world poverty, as she suggests. “Trade not aid” is only one of several newish mantras among aidniks that seem to have passed her by.”
A review of reviews by The Complete Review on "Dead Aid" concludes: “No consensus -- and the global financial-world meltdown makes for bad timing for the argument.”
I couldn’t find the time to read the book yet, so it was with great pleasure and gratefulness that, while gradually catching up with ‘all the fuss about it’ (which included Moyo's nomination by Time Magazine as one of the 100 most influential people in the world), I came across what is certainly one of the most meaningful reviews made of it. Meaningful on various counts: it was one of the first among the many published so far; it was written by a Zambian; it was made by an economist; it was by my good friend Cho. And, above all, it was a thorough, insightful, thought-provoking and analytically-sound review too. Moreover, it was enriched by the interesting debate it generated among his readers. I am sorry that I missed it at the time, but having read it in the last few days I can only strongly recommend it to my readers as well. Here’s the gist of it:
"The central argument of Dead Aid is that aid is the fundamental cause of poverty and therefore eliminating aid is critical to spur growth in ailing African states. Aid is the disease that we must treat to bring us back to full economic health. A bold and daring statement built around the central belief that aid distorts incentives among policymakers and society at large. It makes governments less accountable to their citizens and has led to civil wars, rampant corruption (electoral and otherwise) and has been central to an undercurrent of irresponsibility culminating in increased and self-reinforcing poverty since independence from colonialism. None of these arguments are new of course, but Dambisa is probably the first economist to boldly claim that aid causes poverty.
If aid is the disease that causes endless bleeding, to stop the bleeding you simply need to stop aid, the only challenge therefore is how to do it. The Dead Aid solution is a five year exit strategy built around the idea of incentivising poor countries to access finance on international markets, supported by the tripod of microfinance, trade/FDI and remittances. In the Dead Aid world there’s a stash of money out there on the international financial markets that is just waiting to be tapped by any African country willing to invest in a credit rating. If African countries can enter these markets and borrow, it would provide the right incentives to spark good governance since the international markets would be more willing to “punish” bad behaviour compared to those that provide aid at infinitum. In other words, borrowing through international financial markets is a sort of "self commitment mechanism" to good governance, and with that comes better long term prosperity. It is certainly likely to be slightly more expensive than “easy money” that concessional loans and grants bring, but by rejecting these overtures nation states will find themselves on a better path to prosperity. The trouble is that African governments have limited incentives to do this on their own, though some have made progress in this direction, so they need to be compelled through the Dead Aid proposal of terminating aid completely within a five year period.
(…)
I am afraid to say, and with deep sorrow, that the Dead Aid proposal falls far short in many areas, with at least four worth highlighting.
First, there’s a general lack of clear analytical rigour evidenced by elementary confusion in key areas : correlation/causality issues; definitional problems; poor evidence on policy counterfactuals; incomplete and unbalanced citation of evidence; and, perhaps more worryingly lack of general familiarity with refined areas of existing literature.
Secondly, the treatment of aid in a homogeneous and aggregate way is particularly problematic. Dead Aid defines aid as the “sum total of concessional loans and grants”, but excludes “emergency aid” e.g. help for Darfur or the Asian Tsunami. There’s no distinction within Dead Aid between budget support, infrastructure aid, person to person aid, heath related aid, grants or concessional loans for discretionary spending. It is all discussed under one umbrella and handed the same fate.
Thirdly, Dead Aid is characterised by a plethora of inconsistent arguments. A key example that stands out is the emotive issue of Chinese investment. Dambisa dedicates a whole chapter explaining why the “Chinese are our friends”, largely arguing from their historical involvement in Africa and their renewed commitment to trade and FDI. However, against a backdrop of Dead Aid’s “anti-dependency” rhetoric , the chant for China appears odd. Let us be clear, China is not only bringing FDI to Africa but it has also brought concessional loans and long term dependency. Zambia’s external debt has now risen to about $2bn since the HIPC completion point, a significant part of that is through new agreements with the Chinese government and Chinese businesses. A closer look at Angola reveals the same truth. Not only is China investing heavily in that country but in exchange it is tying Angola and other countries to China for a long time reducing their options to renege in the future. That is not necessarily bad, but if the central worry is that dependency leads to ineffective governments with poor incentives we should be honest enough to consider the possibility that China’s closeness to many African governments (which are not all democratic) may have similar negative impacts as aid.
Fourth and finally, the solutions proposed by Dead Aid are ineffective. This is not surprising because without a clear definition of the problem, it is inevitable that the solutions would not work. But even if one was to accept Dead Aid’s basic premise that aid is bad, its solutions come far short. It’s quite obvious to any ordinary analyst that in order to assess whether any proposals would present an overall improvement beyond the status quo, we need to define what happens in the counterfactual carefully and then judge that against proposed policy initiatives.
(…)
In short on both theory and practice, Dead Aid falls far short of what is expected of a book advocating such a radical proposal of “turning off the aid tap”. If there’s any consolation in this assessment, it is that Dead Aid will hopefully not find any intellectual traction. The analytical consensus remains that aid is important and the challenge is how to make it smarter, better and ultimately beneficial to the poor. This question has never been more urgent given the limited aid resources around. Dambisa is certainly right about one thing, now is the time to examine these issues and we can certainly do better than the present!"
Thursday, 11 December 2008
OS DIREITOS HUMANOS E OS OBJECTIVOS DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DO MILENIO
Cortesia do amigo Luis, este relatorio lancado ontem em Lisboa. Thursday, 31 July 2008
MY LAST ARTICLE FOR AFRICANPATH
DEVELOPMENT AID TO AFRICA: QUO VADIS? (Part II)Poverty is in the eye of the beholder _ Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize of Economics
A year has passed since the much talked about issue of Vanity Fair on Africa, with its spectacular twenty different covers. It has also been a year since I wrote my first take on it, expressed my reticences about the Sachs v. Easterly debate and promised to come back to Sachs’ ‘Big Dream’ for Africa… I finally decided to come back to it, but I’m afraid only to reiterate my initial reticences. This is, therefore, my last take on the issue – which is only appropriate since this is also my last article for Africanpath.
From the top of my head I can think of a few established “engines of growth” in the developing world, such as ‘infrastructure development’, ‘technology transfer’, ‘seed capital’, ‘value-addition to raw materials’, ‘comparative advantages-based trade’, ‘self-sustained agriculture’, ‘redistribution of assets’, ‘small business development’, ‘social enterprise’, ‘primary and secondary education’, ‘vocational training’, ‘learning by doing’, 'women's political and economic empowerment', ‘institutional strengthening and organisational streamlining’, etc., among a range of inputs across the various economic sectors that can significantly contribute to endogenous economic, human and social development.
Unfortunately, though, there is a major drawback to that kind of projects which ultimately prevents them, in most cases, from being taken as reliable and sustainable inputs to development: they are randomly located and funded and, more importantly, exogenously determined and disconnected from the targeted regions and countries’ economic, political and institutional structures. At this point, I am compelled to return to that Vanity Fair issue to recast the tale of that African Health Minister who was so grateful to Sachs for the extra money she got for her ministry’s budget and Sachs’ expressed outrage at the “ridiculously small budget allocated to health” in that and other African countries.
That critical ‘entry point’ refers to the, concealed or overly assumed, sense of ‘guilt’ apparently moving its main protagonists and determining the way poverty in Africa is seen through the eyes of their beholders – the same eyes which appear wide shut to such realities as the one reported just two days ago by the Black AIDS Institute, according to which the incidence of HIV/AIDS in the US is higher than that observed in some of the African countries most affected by the epidemic, such as Botswana or Uganda. It is this sense of (just misguided or simply irrational?) ‘guilt’ which is acting as a “engine of growth” for that self-justified industry and, with its self-centered, self-righteous captains often perceived in the recipient countries as the ‘new colonisers’ or the ‘new missionaries’ (yes, “The White Man’s Burden” is back with a vengeance…), perpetuating the dependency structures that have characterised for centuries the relationship between the West and Africa – a continent many invariably conceive as an abstract entity only awaiting their arrival to materialise itself into real countries with real (if frequently failing) governments, real people with dreams and aspirations of their own, real cities and villages with their own rhythms and paces, real cultures and institutions with their own history, in short, a real continent with its own place in the world. Thus all seems to suggest that the “charitable aid industry” has been more effective as a guilt relief engine than a poverty relief one.
I would like to finish on a positive note, though, by calling your attention to this young African and the inspiration and faith in the future of the continent he has been inspiring: now, that’s what I call a ‘Cheetah’!
DEVELOPMENT AID TO AFRICA: QUO VADIS? (Part II)Poverty is in the eye of the beholder _ Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize of Economics
A year has passed since the much talked about issue of Vanity Fair on Africa, with its spectacular twenty different covers. It has also been a year since I wrote my first take on it, expressed my reticences about the Sachs v. Easterly debate and promised to come back to Sachs’ ‘Big Dream’ for Africa… I finally decided to come back to it, but I’m afraid only to reiterate my initial reticences. This is, therefore, my last take on the issue – which is only appropriate since this is also my last article for Africanpath.
From the top of my head I can think of a few established “engines of growth” in the developing world, such as ‘infrastructure development’, ‘technology transfer’, ‘seed capital’, ‘value-addition to raw materials’, ‘comparative advantages-based trade’, ‘self-sustained agriculture’, ‘redistribution of assets’, ‘small business development’, ‘social enterprise’, ‘primary and secondary education’, ‘vocational training’, ‘learning by doing’, 'women's political and economic empowerment', ‘institutional strengthening and organisational streamlining’, etc., among a range of inputs across the various economic sectors that can significantly contribute to endogenous economic, human and social development.
Unfortunately, though, there is a major drawback to that kind of projects which ultimately prevents them, in most cases, from being taken as reliable and sustainable inputs to development: they are randomly located and funded and, more importantly, exogenously determined and disconnected from the targeted regions and countries’ economic, political and institutional structures. At this point, I am compelled to return to that Vanity Fair issue to recast the tale of that African Health Minister who was so grateful to Sachs for the extra money she got for her ministry’s budget and Sachs’ expressed outrage at the “ridiculously small budget allocated to health” in that and other African countries.
That critical ‘entry point’ refers to the, concealed or overly assumed, sense of ‘guilt’ apparently moving its main protagonists and determining the way poverty in Africa is seen through the eyes of their beholders – the same eyes which appear wide shut to such realities as the one reported just two days ago by the Black AIDS Institute, according to which the incidence of HIV/AIDS in the US is higher than that observed in some of the African countries most affected by the epidemic, such as Botswana or Uganda. It is this sense of (just misguided or simply irrational?) ‘guilt’ which is acting as a “engine of growth” for that self-justified industry and, with its self-centered, self-righteous captains often perceived in the recipient countries as the ‘new colonisers’ or the ‘new missionaries’ (yes, “The White Man’s Burden” is back with a vengeance…), perpetuating the dependency structures that have characterised for centuries the relationship between the West and Africa – a continent many invariably conceive as an abstract entity only awaiting their arrival to materialise itself into real countries with real (if frequently failing) governments, real people with dreams and aspirations of their own, real cities and villages with their own rhythms and paces, real cultures and institutions with their own history, in short, a real continent with its own place in the world. Thus all seems to suggest that the “charitable aid industry” has been more effective as a guilt relief engine than a poverty relief one.
I would like to finish on a positive note, though, by calling your attention to this young African and the inspiration and faith in the future of the continent he has been inspiring: now, that’s what I call a ‘Cheetah’!
Wednesday, 25 June 2008
“GIVE THEM CAKE!”
Os Britanicos, em particular os “policy analysts” e/ou “activistas do social”, usam frequentemente essa frase para criticar medidas de politica, ou simples projectos localizados, que se apresentem completamente desajustados ao(s) problema(s) que pretendem resolver ou mitigar e particularmente inocuos (no limite, ofensivos) face a realidade vivida pelos individuos ou grupos visados por tais iniciativas (ver uma analise aplicada dessa questao aqui). Esse tipo de critica chega a provocar a queda de governos (pelo menos em paises como este…) particularmente quando estao envolvidos dinheiros publicos.
A frase e’ atribuida a Rainha Marie Antoinette e uma das versoes da sua historia reza que, estando ela a ser brindada pela sua coorte com um concerto de violino, piano e ballet, foi interrompida pelo clamor de multidoes de “descamisados” em frente ao seu palacio. Tendo ela indagado o que se passava, um dos seus servicais informou-a de que se tratava de “gente absolutamente pobre e miseravel, vivendo em favelas sem agua, luz ou saneamento e com altissimos niveis de criminalidade, gente sem trabalho, terra, acesso a educacao ou a alimentacao condigna… em suma, tao pobres que nem pao tinham para dar aos seus filhos”! Ao que a Rainha retorquiu: “Ah, nao teem pao? Entao deam-lhes bolo!”
A historia tambem reza que essa foi a principal razao pela qual Marie Antoinette foi guilhotinada durante a Revolucao Francesa…
A que proposito vem esta historia? Bem, poderiamos responder como aquela outra Rainha: “(de) nada senhor(es)… sao apenas rosas…”
Os Britanicos, em particular os “policy analysts” e/ou “activistas do social”, usam frequentemente essa frase para criticar medidas de politica, ou simples projectos localizados, que se apresentem completamente desajustados ao(s) problema(s) que pretendem resolver ou mitigar e particularmente inocuos (no limite, ofensivos) face a realidade vivida pelos individuos ou grupos visados por tais iniciativas (ver uma analise aplicada dessa questao aqui). Esse tipo de critica chega a provocar a queda de governos (pelo menos em paises como este…) particularmente quando estao envolvidos dinheiros publicos.
A frase e’ atribuida a Rainha Marie Antoinette e uma das versoes da sua historia reza que, estando ela a ser brindada pela sua coorte com um concerto de violino, piano e ballet, foi interrompida pelo clamor de multidoes de “descamisados” em frente ao seu palacio. Tendo ela indagado o que se passava, um dos seus servicais informou-a de que se tratava de “gente absolutamente pobre e miseravel, vivendo em favelas sem agua, luz ou saneamento e com altissimos niveis de criminalidade, gente sem trabalho, terra, acesso a educacao ou a alimentacao condigna… em suma, tao pobres que nem pao tinham para dar aos seus filhos”! Ao que a Rainha retorquiu: “Ah, nao teem pao? Entao deam-lhes bolo!”
A historia tambem reza que essa foi a principal razao pela qual Marie Antoinette foi guilhotinada durante a Revolucao Francesa…
A que proposito vem esta historia? Bem, poderiamos responder como aquela outra Rainha: “(de) nada senhor(es)… sao apenas rosas…”
Tuesday, 16 October 2007
AMBIENTE VS. POBREZA?
No início da cimeira mundial de Joanesburgo concluída esta semana, várias sondagens questionaram a opinião pública britânica sobre se o evento deveria ter como prioridade o ambiente ou a pobreza (ou, noutra versão, os pássaros ou o emprego). Os resultados indicaram em media 60% a favor do ambiente (pássaros) e 40% a favor da pobreza (emprego), o que poderá ser indicativo do aparente conflito de interesses entre o Norte e o Sul no que toca ao futuro da terra. Mas, de facto, a oposição da protecção do ambiente à erradicação da pobreza representa, sob várias perspectivas, uma falsa dicotomia.
O entendimento da erradicação da pobreza e da defesa do ambiente como objectivos conflituantes deve-se, em grande medida, às implicações da ortodoxia neoclássica, dominante nas últimas duas décadas, para os chamados limites do crescimento (i.e., o facto de o crescimento económico ser característicamente exponencial, enquanto o crescimento dos recursos naturais é geométrico). Segundo aquela ortodoxia, por um lado, a degradação ambiental seria uma inevitável parceira do crescimento económico e, por outro lado, os principais motores do crescimento no Sul dependeriam exclusivamente de estratégias nacionais que favorecessem a iniciativa privada, a eliminação de subsídios ao consumo de bens sociais básicos e a abertura de mercados domésticos ao investimento e competição internacionais, passando pela privatização de empresas estatais e pelo desmantelamento de quaisquer projectos de substituição de importações.
Os países que seguissem essa estratégia teriam necessáriamente que passar por episódicos aumentos dos seus níveis de pobreza, mas teriam como garantidas imprecedentes taxas de crescimento que, por via do chamado efeito de ‘trickle down’ (i.e. a disseminação de cima para baixo dos rendimentos económicos nacionais), acabariam por diminuir os níveis de pobreza e por reverter os seus colaterais custos ambientais.

Todavia, a evidência demonstrou que, enquanto a devastação ecológica causada pelos maiores poluidores e consumidores de recursos esgotáveis do Norte se manteve ou acelerou, o efeito de ‘trickle down’, se não foi exactamente uma ficção, falhou dramáticamente na maior parte dos países do Sul, ficando os poucos casos de relativo sucesso a dever-se em grande medida a factores estranhos à ortodoxia neoclássica, tais como um alto nível de activismo governamental e proteccionismo em favor de corporações e redes de influência privada nacionais, num ambiente de quase total arbitrariedade no mercado laboral (caso dos “tigres” Asiáticos) ou políticas de reforma agrária e de realocação de títulos de propriedade a par de projectos empresariais de iniciativa comunitária (caso de alguns estados da India).
Embora a abertura ao investimento e comércio internacional se tenha demonstrado, em alguns casos, benéfica para a diversificação económica e o aumento de certos rendimentos sectoriais (caso da China), alguns dos países do Sul que parecem estar a integrar-se na economia global continuam dependentes de sectores de baixo valor acrescentado e com um impacto diminuto nos seus níveis de pobreza (caso geral em África e na América Latina).
Dentre os factores contributivos para esse resultado contam-se as barreiras ao comércio (tarifárias, não tarifárias, administrativas e técnicas) que os países do Sul enfrentam nos mercados do Norte (os quais têm por prática “despejar” os seus excedentes de produção subsidiada e, frequentemente, abaixo dos seus próprios padrões de qualidade, nos mercados do Sul) e as vigentes leis internacionais de propriedade intelectual que não só aumentam os custos da transferência tecnológica mas, crucialmente, tambem impedem o acesso das populações que deles mais necessitam aos medicamentos indispensáveis ao combate das doenças mais prevalentes nos países pobres, em particular o SIDA.
Os efeitos societais negativos deste adverso cenário internacional têm sido exacerbados pela má gestão económica, as cleptocracias, a corrupção e a autocracia comuns nos países do Sul, em particular naqueles com abundantes reservas de fontes de energia, tais como o petróleo e o gás natural.
Apesar dos conflitos de interesses ainda prevalecentes entre o Norte e o Sul, espera-se que a recente ‘Cimeira Mundial sobre o Desenvolvimento Sustentável’ tenha pelo menos facilitado a obtenção de um consenso generalizado que possibilite o equilíbrio entre consumo sustentável no Norte e crescimento sustentável no Sul, por forma a que a observação de pássaros por famílias saudáveis e com emprego estável, particularmente em África, seja possível num horizonte temporal não muito longínquo.
(Ler artigo completo AQUI)
No início da cimeira mundial de Joanesburgo concluída esta semana, várias sondagens questionaram a opinião pública britânica sobre se o evento deveria ter como prioridade o ambiente ou a pobreza (ou, noutra versão, os pássaros ou o emprego). Os resultados indicaram em media 60% a favor do ambiente (pássaros) e 40% a favor da pobreza (emprego), o que poderá ser indicativo do aparente conflito de interesses entre o Norte e o Sul no que toca ao futuro da terra. Mas, de facto, a oposição da protecção do ambiente à erradicação da pobreza representa, sob várias perspectivas, uma falsa dicotomia.
O entendimento da erradicação da pobreza e da defesa do ambiente como objectivos conflituantes deve-se, em grande medida, às implicações da ortodoxia neoclássica, dominante nas últimas duas décadas, para os chamados limites do crescimento (i.e., o facto de o crescimento económico ser característicamente exponencial, enquanto o crescimento dos recursos naturais é geométrico). Segundo aquela ortodoxia, por um lado, a degradação ambiental seria uma inevitável parceira do crescimento económico e, por outro lado, os principais motores do crescimento no Sul dependeriam exclusivamente de estratégias nacionais que favorecessem a iniciativa privada, a eliminação de subsídios ao consumo de bens sociais básicos e a abertura de mercados domésticos ao investimento e competição internacionais, passando pela privatização de empresas estatais e pelo desmantelamento de quaisquer projectos de substituição de importações.
Os países que seguissem essa estratégia teriam necessáriamente que passar por episódicos aumentos dos seus níveis de pobreza, mas teriam como garantidas imprecedentes taxas de crescimento que, por via do chamado efeito de ‘trickle down’ (i.e. a disseminação de cima para baixo dos rendimentos económicos nacionais), acabariam por diminuir os níveis de pobreza e por reverter os seus colaterais custos ambientais.

Todavia, a evidência demonstrou que, enquanto a devastação ecológica causada pelos maiores poluidores e consumidores de recursos esgotáveis do Norte se manteve ou acelerou, o efeito de ‘trickle down’, se não foi exactamente uma ficção, falhou dramáticamente na maior parte dos países do Sul, ficando os poucos casos de relativo sucesso a dever-se em grande medida a factores estranhos à ortodoxia neoclássica, tais como um alto nível de activismo governamental e proteccionismo em favor de corporações e redes de influência privada nacionais, num ambiente de quase total arbitrariedade no mercado laboral (caso dos “tigres” Asiáticos) ou políticas de reforma agrária e de realocação de títulos de propriedade a par de projectos empresariais de iniciativa comunitária (caso de alguns estados da India).
Embora a abertura ao investimento e comércio internacional se tenha demonstrado, em alguns casos, benéfica para a diversificação económica e o aumento de certos rendimentos sectoriais (caso da China), alguns dos países do Sul que parecem estar a integrar-se na economia global continuam dependentes de sectores de baixo valor acrescentado e com um impacto diminuto nos seus níveis de pobreza (caso geral em África e na América Latina).
Dentre os factores contributivos para esse resultado contam-se as barreiras ao comércio (tarifárias, não tarifárias, administrativas e técnicas) que os países do Sul enfrentam nos mercados do Norte (os quais têm por prática “despejar” os seus excedentes de produção subsidiada e, frequentemente, abaixo dos seus próprios padrões de qualidade, nos mercados do Sul) e as vigentes leis internacionais de propriedade intelectual que não só aumentam os custos da transferência tecnológica mas, crucialmente, tambem impedem o acesso das populações que deles mais necessitam aos medicamentos indispensáveis ao combate das doenças mais prevalentes nos países pobres, em particular o SIDA.
Os efeitos societais negativos deste adverso cenário internacional têm sido exacerbados pela má gestão económica, as cleptocracias, a corrupção e a autocracia comuns nos países do Sul, em particular naqueles com abundantes reservas de fontes de energia, tais como o petróleo e o gás natural.
Apesar dos conflitos de interesses ainda prevalecentes entre o Norte e o Sul, espera-se que a recente ‘Cimeira Mundial sobre o Desenvolvimento Sustentável’ tenha pelo menos facilitado a obtenção de um consenso generalizado que possibilite o equilíbrio entre consumo sustentável no Norte e crescimento sustentável no Sul, por forma a que a observação de pássaros por famílias saudáveis e com emprego estável, particularmente em África, seja possível num horizonte temporal não muito longínquo.
(Ler artigo completo AQUI)




